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Framework of the Study 
 Purpose: To perform an economic analysis of 
TINA 
 Economics based, incentive-centric approach 
 Policy Implications  
Truth in Negotiations Act 
(TINA) 
 TINA was first enacted in 1962 (Public Law 
87-653) 
 
 TINA requires contractors (often sole-source 
or near sole-source) to submit “cost or pricing 
data” that is “current, complete, and accurate.”  
 
 Failing to disclose truthful information could 




 Principal-Agent Contract Setting 
 
 DoD procurement is subject to two kinds of 
problems 
 
      Adverse Selection (Hidden Information) 
 




 Two objectives of optimal contracting: limit 
information rents earned by agent; induce 
the agent’s best effort. 
 
 Power of Incentive Schemes varies across the 
spectrum of contract types 
 
        FFP: high power incentive scheme 
       CPFF: low power incentive scheme 
Economic Literature 
Review (cont’d) 
 The non-commitment nature of the government 
contracts naturally leads to contractors’ fears of being 
“ratcheted up” if they reveal their lowest possible cost. 
 
 Cost Padding includes, but is not limited to, incurring 
excessive costs to the government, such as leisurely 
meetings, first class travel, and business lunches. 
Other examples are shifting overhead costs from 
commercial business to government contracts and 
engaging in various bookkeeping tricks to manipulate 
costs. 
 




Distorted Incentives: Use of TINA with Firm 
Fixed Price (FFP) Contracts  
 Background: there is a current policy push toward more use 
of FFP contracts. 
 FFP contracts without TINA, despite many weaknesses, are 
free of the moral hazard problem. 
 FFP contracts, with TINA, lose the benefit of being a high 
power incentive scheme. 
 “TINA cannot force defense contractors to reveal the lowest 
possible cost that they could produce at if they exerted an 
optimal effort. Rather, it essentially tells them that the price 










A numerical example 
 We use the theoretical framework in Laffont and Tirole 
(1993), under which a contractor’s cost function is specified 
as follows: 
𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐(β,e)            (1) 
where β is a state parameter (e.g., technology) and e is the effort. One can 
interpret that β is the adverse selection parameter and represents a 
contractor’s private information, and e is the moral hazard parameter.  
 
Without losing generality, assume the state parameter β has three possible 
outcomes: good, neutral, or bad, with equal probability of occurring.  











A numerical example (cont’d) 
 Imagine the cost function takes the following form: 
𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽 +
10
𝑒𝑒
            
Note that the cost increases with β (so β is an inverse indicator of state 
parameter) and decreases with e (effort reduces cost). 
 
 Case 1) Good situation: (β=10), with probability 1/3 
𝑐𝑐 = 10 +
10
𝑒𝑒
           (2) 
 Case 2) Neutral situation: (β=20), with probability 1/3. 
𝑐𝑐 = 20 +
10
𝑒𝑒
       (3) 
 Case 3) Bad situation: (β=30), with probability 1/3. 
𝑐𝑐 = 30 +
10
𝑒𝑒










A numerical example (cont’d) 
 Hidden Information:  The contractor knows the probability 
distribution of the natural state, whereas the government 
does not know. 
 Assume that the contractor’s negotiation strategy is to 
ensure breakeven even in the bad situation, and he or she 
can still shirk. 
 Consequently, the contractor will submit $40 as the cost 
estimate by equation (4), and the less informed government 
would most likely accept. 
 Assume that the government imposes TINA, stating that if 
the incurred cost is more than 25% lower than $40 (i.e., 










A numerical example (cont’d) 
 One-shot game 
 The sequences of actions: The contractor submits the 
bidding price, accepted by the government, who attaches 
TINA to the FFP contract. Then the natural state reveals, 
the contractor chooses effort, and finally, the cost is 
incurred. 
 If a bad situation happens, the contractor will choose to 
work hard (e=10), so the cost is $31 by equation (4), a TINA 
audit is not triggered, and the contractor earned a profit of 
$9. There is no moral hazard problem in this situation. 














A numerical example (cont’d) 
 In the case of a neutral situation, if the contractor works 
hard (e=10), his or her cost would be $21 by equation (3), 
which is good in the absence of TINA, yet not good when 
TINA is in place; this is because any cost below $30 would 
trigger a TINA audit. The contractor, knowing this risk, 
would choose to shirk (e=1), so the cost will be $30 by 
equation (3), which successfully hides the contractor under 
the radar of TINA. In this scenario, the moral hazard 
problem is created by TINA. 














A numerical example (cont’d) 
 What if the most favorable natural state emerges? In that case, if the 
contractor works hard, he or she will incur a cost of $11 by equation (2), 
which is going to raise a big red flag to the government. Therefore, the 
contractor is going to shirk; however, because the natural state turns out to be 
so favorable, even shirking is not enough to mute the alarm of TINA. (Note 
that shirking in case 1 would yield a cost of $20, which is below the audit 
threshold value of $30, and hence will trigger the TINA audit.) So what would 
the contractor do to evade the TINA investigation? The contractor will 
engage in cost padding and artificially increase the reported cost to at least 
$30, so he or she will not get into trouble. Now in this scenario, TINA not 
only created a Moral Hazard problem, but also generated bad incentives for 
defense contractors to engage in unethical and opportunistic cost padding.  










         
Policy Implications: 
 
Fixing Incentives: From Static to 
Dynamic Perspective 
 One-shot Static Game 
      A good starting point is a static situation where no further 
contract is possible. Using the numerical example, the government 
already paid $40; because the contractor can avoid a TINA audit 
in all three possible scenarios by either shirking or cost padding or 
both, the government payment becomes fixed. Therefore, any 
higher profit of a contractor will lead to a higher social welfare. 
The implication is straightforward: In order to correct the ill 
incentives created by TINA in the context of FFP, policy makers 
need to undo the bundling, that is, remove TINA from FFP, so the 
FFP is back to a high power incentive scheme.  
 
 
         
Policy Implications: 
 
Fixing Incentives: From Static to 
Dynamic Perspective 
 Repeated game with non-commitment 
      In the one-shot static game, when TINA is removed from an FFP contract, the contractor is fully 
motivated to exert the best effort to maximize profit. Since no future contract is possible, the contractor 
is not afraid to reveal private information (i.e., the minimum cost that can be achieved through the best 
effort), because there is no possibility for the government to exploit the private information revealed 
against the contractor in the future.  
        In a repeated game where contracts have one base year and option years which can be exercised by 
the government, a simple removal of TINA from a one-year FFP contract may not be sufficient to 
induce the contractor’s best effort. The contractor is in a very vulnerable position in the sense that if he 
or she chooses to reveal private information at the early stage of the game, that information may be used 
against him or her later so no future information rents would be possible.  
        If a one-year FFP contract without TINA is not enough to motivate, the government should 
consider multiple-year FFP contracts without TINA. This is especially useful if the product is demanded 
on a continuous basis. The idea is this: Make the reward of revealing the best-effort cost big enough that 
the contractor voluntarily tells the government the lowest achievable cost. It is wise to let the contractor 
win early, win big, but win only once. The government, and hence the taxpayers, win in the long run and 




         
Policy Implications: 
 
Fixing Incentives: From Static to 
Dynamic Perspective 
 Multiple-years contracts:  
     Numerical example continued 
        Without losing generality, assume the government needs to order this product every year 
for 15 years. If each year, TINA is attached for 15 annual contracts, the contractor will always 
choose to shirk or “shirk and cost padding” in order to avoid the TINA audit, as well as keep the 
information rents for the future. Hence, the government will end up paying $600.  
       Assume that a five-year FFP contract is sufficient to induce the contractor to exert his or her 
best effort. Therefore, the government commits to pay $40 each year for five years with no 
TINA strings attached. With this commitment, the contractor is fully motivated to work as hard 
as possible, and the lowest possible cost is revealed to the government. The government, who 
observes that the true expected lowest possible cost is $21 (i.e., 1
3
∗ 11 + 1
3
∗ 21 + 1
3
∗ 31), will 
use that information to price the future 10-year contracts. Under the assumption that a 10% 
profit is allowable, the government will offer a $23.1 ($21*1.1) annual FFP contract for the 
remaining 10 years. So the total government payment now becomes $40*5+$23.1*10=$431, a 
savings of $169 relative to the original situation. Note that if the time span is longer—say, 25 
years as opposed to 15 years—then the government savings will be even larger. 
 
       
Conclusions 
 Current TINA practices, despite the good intentions 
of the act, are subject to unintended negative 
consequences that arise from contractors’ bad 
incentives. Such bad incentives are inherently 
associated with the current TINA framework.  
 
 A lax use of TINA may be better than a strict one. 
